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This Court entered a Memorandum of Decision on February 23, 1996, 
affirming summary judgment for Respondent Calhoun. In accordance with Rule 
35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Brittner now petitions 
this Court for rehearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central issue in this case, whether Respondent Calhoun owed any 
duty to Appellant Brittner, is determined solely by the contract between 
Respondent Calhoun and the Salt Lake City Airport Authority. The contract 
language is unambiguous; therefore, it is unnecessary to rely on information 
outside of the contract to resolve the question of Calhoun's duty. 
This Court made several critical errors in its decision. First, it failed to 
mention or consider specific contract language that shows that Calhoun assumed 
a landowner's broad duty of care toward business invitees. Such a duty was not 
divided as between the Airport Authority and Calhoun, as is implied by this 
Court's decision. Nothing in the contract indicates that the Airport Authority 
reserved a duty to inspect, while delegating a duty to clean to Calhoun. 
Second, this Court relied on contract language stating that Calhoun would 
perform additional or emergency services upon request, but then overlooked the 
remaining portion of that phrase, Mor as needed." This language, which must be 
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read as imposing an additional requirement beyond "upon request," clearly 
shows that Calhoun had a duty above and beyond the duty to clean only when 
notified by the Airport Authority. 
Finally, the Court failed to address Appellant's argument that Calhoun 
had a duty to warn airport travelers of the foreseeable hazards created by the 
day-long accumulation of snow. By placing signs at the airport entrances 
warning incoming passengers of slippery floors, Calhoun assumed the duty of a 
landowner to warn invitees of hazards. Calhoun therefore had a duty to warn 
all passengers, not just those arriving via ground transportation. 
These errors are material, and make the Court's construction of the 
Calhoun-Airport Authority contract factually and legally incorrect. For these 
reasons, Appellant Brittner requests that the Court grant her Petition for 
Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Calhoun assumed all duties of a landowner in its contract with 
the Airport Authority. There is no language in the contract 
reserving certain duties to the Airport Authority. 
By the terms of its own contract, Calhoun assumed all responsibilities of 
a landowner: to protect the public, to provide the labor needed to maintain high 
standards of cleanliness, to maintain the premises in a dry condition, to provide 
regular maintenance, and to remove spills. In addition, the terms of the contract 
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establish that the standard of care which Calhoun agreed to assume was "above 
average." None of this crucial language was mentioned in the Court's decision. 
In the contract, Calhoun assumed exclusive "responsibility for 
management of the janitorial service program described in this contract 
document." Contract §2.01(A), Record at 60. Calhoun further assumed 
responsibility to provide all management and labor "required to satisfactorily 
maintain the level of cleanliness ordinarily associated with above average 
facilities." Contract § 2.01(B), Record at 60 (emphasis added). These terms 
are unambiguous, and can only be interpreted as meaning what they say: that 
Calhoun assumed the duty to maintain the premises in a clean and safe 
condition for the public. This is the duty owed by a landowner toward a 
business invitee. 
Any doubt as to the nature of the duty assumed by Calhoun is overcome 
by the contract term stating that Calhoun will be responsible "for any injuries to, 
or the death of any persons, or damage to property resulting form any cause 
whatsoever arising out of or in connection with his performance of the Work...." 
Contract § 7.01(A), Record at 85. Thus, for any injuries on the premises 
resulting from Calhoun's failure to meet its responsibilities under the contract, 
i.e., to keep the facility in a clean and dry condition, Calhoun is to be held 
responsible. If that assumption of responsibility is not clear enough, Calhoun 
also agreed "to indemnity (sic), save harmless and defend City, its agents and 
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employees from and against all claims, mechanic's liens, damage, demands, 
actions, costs and charges arising out of or by reason of the Contractor's 
services at the Airport...." Contract, Agreement § 17(a), Record at 118. Finally, 
Calhoun also agreed to provide comprehensive general liability insurance, with 
the City as an additional named insured, in the minimum amount of One 
Million ($1,000,000) Dollars combined single limit. Contract, Agreement § 5(b), 
Record at 111. 
The contract between Calhoun and the Airport Authority must be 
construed as a whole. When so construed, it is clear that Calhoun did not 
assume merely the duty clean when told to do so. It assumed a much greater 
duty, as evidenced by the terms cited above. Taken as a whole, these terms 
show that the contract between the Airport Authority and Calhoun clearly 
delegated the landowner's duty of care to Calhoun. 
B. This Court's holding that Calhoun had a duty to clean only when 
notified overlooks the remaining crucial language of the sentence in 
the contract, "or as needed." 
This Court held that Calhoun had a contractual duty to remove or correct 
hazards M[o]nly when notified." Memorandum of Decision at 2. But even if the 
water on the floor where Appellant Brittner fell was, as decided by this Court, 
an emergency situation not remedied by routine cleaning, the contract 
specifically states that Calhoun will perform "emergency cleanup," including 
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"maintaining the facility in a dry condition," "upon request of the Airport or as 
needed" Contract §2.11(A), Record at 63-4 (emphasis added). This Court's 
decision either overlooked the words "or as needed," or interpreted those words 
as meaning that Calhoun had to be notified. It is a basic tenet of contract 
interpretation that interpretation should not render any language surplusage, if 
possible. This Court's interpretation does just that. The words "or as needed" 
are rendered meaningless by this Court's decision. Such an interpretation is 
legally incorrect. 
If Calhoun is required to perform emergency services "as needed," such 
language imposes a duty above and beyond the duty to clean when notified of a 
spill. This Court must interpret the contract as drafted and signed by the 
parties, which unambiguously requires Calhoun to perform emergency services 
"as needed." 
C. This Court's interpretation of the duty to "police" is not 
supported by the contract or by extrinsic evidence. 
Calhoun is required by the terms of the contract to create a Work Plan, 
which is designed to implement the details of Calhoun's contractual duties. See 
Contract at § 2.03(A), Record at 60-61. According to that plan, Calhoun had an 
employee assigned to the precise area where Plaintiff fell, at the precise time 
that she fell. Work Plan, Record at 205-06. Employee SGC-04 is required "to 
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police" the Terminal Unit Two lobby, where Plaintiff fell, between 9:30 p.m. 
and 10:15 p.m. every night. Work Plan, Record at 206. 
In its decision, this Court interpreted the word "police" as not including a 
duty to inspect the area for hazards. Memorandum of Decision at 2. But the 
word "police" is not defined anywhere in the contract. The meaning of the 
word can best be discerned from reading the entire description of Employee 
SGC-04's duties: "Police all seating area's [sic], remove all debris from area 
and sweep or hokey floor in all area's [sic] as needed." Work Plan, Record at 
201. This description suggests that Employee SGC-04 is to keep an eye out for 
debris on the floor-which would logically include water~and to remove it. 
This interpretation is supported by testimony regarding Calhoun's actual 
practices. One of the two witnesses to Plaintiffs fall testified that Calhoun 
employees are seen regularly between 9 and 11 o'clock p.m. in the area where 
Plaintiff fell. Renehan Depo. at 30-31, Record at 238. His description of the 
Calhoun employees' work is that they "mop up, sweep up, whatever might need 
to be done as maintenance or cleanup-type operation" Id. (emphasis added). 
This testimony supports Appellant Brittner's construction of the contractual 
"policing" requirement, i.e., that Calhoun is required to inspect for hazards. 
The only evidence that can be used to contradict Appellant's construction 
of this requirement is the Gomm affidavit describing the practice of "2400" 
calls. Gomm Affidavit f 5, Record at 52. But the interpretation of the "2400" 
6 
calls that is most consistent with the contract as a whole, and therefore most 
legally correct, is that the 2400 calls simply implemented the "upon request" 
language of the contract. As noted above, there are numerous contractual terms 
placing a duty on Calhoun to protect the public, to be responsible for all 
injuries, to maintain the facility in a clean and dry condition, and to perform 
emergency cleanup as needed. These terms cannot be ignored when interpreting 
the meaning of "police." 
To interpret the term "police" in a manner that so clearly contradicts all 
of these contractual terms is to commit a legal error. Because this Court's 
interpretation of the "policing" requirement is not supported by the contract or 
by extrinsic evidence, the Court should reconsider its decision. 
D. This Court did not address Appellant's argument that Calhoun 
had a duty to warn travelers of the hazardous condition of the floors, 
in addition to a duty to remedy such condition. 
Appellant Brittner has consistently argued that Calhoun had a duty to 
warn travelers arriving by air of the potentially hazardous condition of the 
floors. According to Steve Ray Gomm, Calhoun's airport manager, 
"considerable snowfall" on the day Appellant was injured prompted Calhoun to 
place signs warning travelers of the "increased need for caution due to wet floor 
conditions." Gomm Affidavit TJ 9, Record at 53. The warning signs placed by 
Calhoun on the day of Appellant's injury were visible only to "persons entering 
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the airport." Gomm Affidavit ^ 9, Record at 53. No signs were placed within 
the airport, even though many travelers, like Appellant, arrive by air and do not 
use the airport entrances. 
Appellant has argued that Calhoun's actual knowledge of the increased 
hazard due to snowfall, regardless of its actual knowledge of the water in which 
appellant slipped and fell, created a duty of diligence. Brief of Appellant at 22-
25. Such a duty may be fulfilled by ensuring that warning signs are visible to 
all travelers, not just a few, as well as by additional "policing" of the potentially 
hazardous areas. 
It is important to note, however, that nothing in the contract specifically 
requires Calhoun to warn the public of hazardous conditions. Therefore, 
Calhoun^ performance of this task suggests either that it assumed the 
landowner's duty to warn of this particular hazard, or that it was aware it had 
already assumed such a duty contractually. Either way, Calhoun assumed a duty 
to warn the public of the hazardous condition of the airport floors on the day in 
question. 
Whether Calhoun exercised sufficient care in warning passengers or 
policing the area is, of course, a question for the jury. But whether Calhoun 
had a duty in the first place is a question of law for this Court. Given the fact 
that Calhoun had already warned some members of the public, Appellant 
Brittner contends it had a duty to adequately warn all members of the public. 
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Appellant respectfully requests this Court to address this argument and 
determine the existence of such a duty. 
CONCLUSION 
Calhoun assumed all responsibilities of a landowner: to protect the public, 
to provide the labor needed to maintain high standards of cleanliness, to 
maintain the premises in a dry condition, to provide regular maintenance, and to 
remove spills. In addition, the terms of the contract establish that the standard 
of care which Calhoun agreed to assume was "above average." Nothing in the 
Contract says that Calhoun's duties are imposed only after notice or that they 
are only "on call." Calhoun's services are required "upon request" or "as 
needed." The Court must interpret the contract as a whole, giving meaning to 
all terms and avoiding the creation of surplusage. 
The Work Plan, which was created at the command of the contract, 
specifically assigns an employee to "police" the area at the time the Plaintiff 
fell. This "Court has mistakenly interpreted the term "police" as excluding the 
duty to inspect for hazards. Such an interpretation is not supported by the 
contract or by extrinsic evidence. 
Finally, this Court failed to address the issue of Calhoun's duty to warn 
travelers arriving by air of the increased hazards created by accumulated 
snowfall. Calhoun had actual knowledge of such hazards, and had taken steps 
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to warn some travelers. Appellant contends that Calhoun's actions create a duty 
to warn all travelers or to take additional steps to ensure the safety of 
passengers. 
For all these reasons, Appellant Brittner respectfully requests the Court to 
grant her Petition for Rehearing. 
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